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Briefing the Swedish policy maker: the analyst-policy maker relationship in a small country

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ABSTRACT

Policy makers tend to pick and choose among conclusions presented to them. This can result in politicization, which ultimately might result in intelligence being blamed for policy failures. This has a negative impact on intelligence analysis, transforming it in an ever more cautious direction which negates its utility in the policy process. Swedish intelligence learnt that for truly important intelligence reporting, in particular that which signified paradigm shifts, the conclusions had to be presented in a manner that had an impact, in an oral briefing. Moreover, the briefer must be prepared to *defend* the service's conclusions. Hence, a keyword in the analyst-policy maker relationship was trust. The relationship had to develop into a partnership, in which the policy maker had the final word but the intelligence analyst did not shrink from presenting the service's argument. This lesson from the Cold War appears to be just as valid in the present.

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Introduction

Former CIA acting director John McLaughlin once concluded that since 'analysis is where all aspects of the intelligence profession come together,' it follows that 'dealing with the policymaker is where all the components of analysis come together.[1]

International experiences show that an intelligence service's real production during the Cold War was not written reports – but knowledgeable experts who could brief the policy makers on the conclusions orally and communicate directly with them. Gregory F. Treverton, an American former Chair of the National Intelligence Council, remembered: 'When I oversaw the National Intelligence Council (NIC) estimates, I realized that the NIES [National Intelligence Estimates] were not our real product. Rather, it was National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) – that is, not paper but people, experts in a position to attend meetings and offer judgment.'[2]

No doubt, knowledgeable experts were particularly important when intelligence services presented unwelcome news.

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[1]John McLaughlin, "Serving the National Policymaker," in *Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives*, eds. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2nd edn, 2014), 81.

[2]Treverton, *Intelligence for an Age of Terror* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 11, 135.

This deduction also affected the intelligence service's understanding of objectivity. An important principle in the scientific tradition, and for this reason, the intelligence tradition, that derived from the Age of Enlightenment was that research, and intelligence, should be neutral, objective, and value-free in nature. But the contacts with policy makers frequently showed that it was unrealistic to expect objective conclusions in a political process. Policy makers tend, consciously or subconsciously, to pick and choose among the intelligence, conclusions, and assessments that are presented to them. The choice is not necessarily based on which conclusion is most probable. Sometimes the choice is instead based on what the policy maker wishes to achieve, or the demands of his or her political platform. Furthermore, policy makers more often base their decisions on prejudices and emotions than the results of the intelligence service. Some are so convinced of their own superior knowledge and intellect that they want to see the raw intelligence data and make their own analysis, disregarding that of the intelligence service. Others soon realize that cherry-picked intelligence can be used to support their already existing views instead of forming the basis for decisions.[3] In all these cases, the policy maker picks and chooses, and the intelligence service has little ability to influence the process. To what good is objectivity then?

In Sweden, the problem had been of less apparent consequence during the Second World War. Germany had relied on an advanced crypto-machine, the Siemens & Halske T 52, also known as the *Geheimschreiber*; however, the Swedish national SIGINT agency FRA broke the *Geheimschreiber* system and from June 1940 until May 1943, the Swedes could read virtually all German military and diplomatic communications passing through their country. The *Geheimschreiber* reporting, which constituted most of Sweden's intelligence output on the intentions of Nazi Germany, had been handed over, without annotations, to the policy makers to interpret as they pleased. But when the intelligence service moved away from reporting uncommented raw data to the reporting of conclusions, which although based on observed facts still included an element of independent assessment, it found that it could no longer stay neutral. Increasingly often, the complex international environment meant that available intelligence could be interpreted in more than one way. It was in such situations certainly conceivable to present several equally possible but conflicting conclusions, and for sure this was one way of giving the policy maker the best possible foundation for an independent decision. However, a report which gave equal weight to several conflicting conclusions tended to have less impact than a single, evidence-based conclusion that was presented with a certain amount of assurance. There was in any case always a risk that the policy maker would choose not to take in the intelligence report but stay with his or her existing opinions or prejudices. Or trust his or her personal expertise, since policy makers occasionally were specialists in their respective fields and really had the required knowledge.[4]

These issues frequently led to claims that there was a risk of politicization within the analyst-policy maker relationship. Most of the debate on politicization and intelligence takes place in public and is devoted to the situation within the great powers, in particular those within the Anglo-Saxon world. The debate primarily pays attention to situations in which failures occurred and policy decisions turned out to have been mistaken. The focus

[3]Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 142.
[4]Jeffrey R. Cooper, *Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), 17.

is on intelligence, not policy, failures. Yet, this focus remains even in situations where evidence indicates the policy maker, not the intelligence analyst, as the most active party in engineering the policy that eventually was implemented and resulted in the failure that ultimately provoked the debate. In other words, intelligence was blamed for what really was policy failures. It is likely that this focus is having a negative impact on intelligence analysis, in effect transforming it in an ever more cautious direction which negates its utility in a policy process. After all, the best way for an intelligence analyst to avoid accusations of politicization is surely to present imprecise and ambiguous conclusions and findings.

If intelligence officers were allowed to make policy recommendations, the argument goes in the Anglo-Saxon world, then they would be tempted to present intelligence that supported the policy which they had first recommended. And this would lead to the loss of objectivity, which might lead to the alteration or distortion of intelligence, which for obvious reasons would be detrimental to the policy-making process. On the other hand, even those who focus on the risks of politicization of intelligence tend to agree that while intelligence officers should not be allowed to make policy recommendations based on their intelligence, policy makers are free to offer assessments that run counter to the available intelligence, in fact are free to disregard intelligence altogether when it suits their political agendas.[5]

This means that, depending on who it was who politicized intelligence, politicization of intelligence can be summarized as either of two synonyms, each followed by its more negative restatement:

(1) The *manipulation* (or *distortion*) of intelligence for political gain
(2) The *use* (or *misuse*) of intelligence for political gain

Since the *use* of intelligence is the very purpose of intelligence in an ongoing policy process, and since policy makers are free to manipulate or distort intelligence according to personal political agendas, it follows that the entire issue is one of political style.[6] The political style of the policy maker determines how intelligence is used, and the 'use or misuse' label depends on results achieved.

Sweden, a small country, never shared the concern, some might say obsession, of the Anglo-Saxon powers with the risks of politicization of intelligence, and the associated negative impact on intelligence analysis that over time transformed it in an ever more cautious direction. Yet, the shifting political and societal contexts, in which demands for transparency and accountability grow ever more important, suggest that an identical impact is taking place in small countries, too. This includes those small countries, such as Sweden, that have comparatively few means and less muscle at their disposal in foreign policy.

The role played by intelligence in many small states was always different from that of the great powers. Yet, in the past the small intelligence services found certain solutions to the eternal problem of how to encourage rational policy making, with decisions grounded in evidence-based conclusions and not mere opinions. Which were those solutions, how did they affect the analyst-policy maker relationship, and are they still

[5]Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (Los Angeles: Sage, 6th edn, 2015), 5, 189–92.
[6]Idem, 189.

valid for present-day intelligence analysis, which takes place in an environment quite different from that of the Cold War?

The Swedish policy environment

Sweden never developed a system of mandatory intelligence briefings for senior policy makers. Nor were minutes produced that contained real details of those briefings that took place. Possibly the reason for this apparent anomaly was that the elected cabinet and attached political advisors tended to be few in number and primarily concerned with domestic political infighting. Meanwhile, the civil service tradition of independent administrative authorities, each with its field of responsibility and each operating autonomously of other authorities, usually ensured that important business was taken care of regardless of the interest, or lack thereof, of the senior elected leadership.

For sure, cabinet ministers were briefed by representatives of the intelligence services from time to time. In most cases, it was the defence and foreign ministers who were briefed. Few prime ministers regularly requested, and received, intelligence briefings.

Most briefings of senior policy makers attended by the present writer were of little significance. At times, the senior policy maker never showed up. When he or she did, the policy maker sometimes departed early for other business. Either way, a policy maker typically contributed little to the discussion, which often became a dialogue between the briefer and the minister's state secretary, a senior political appointee, second in rank to the cabinet minister, who would be there and remain even if the policy maker did not.

When the senior policy maker was present, the briefer might have to resort to a certain level of guile to carry out the briefing. The first such briefing of a cabinet minister that I attended, in 1986, was a good example of what might be required. This was a briefing of Roine Carlsson, Sweden's Defence Minister from 1985 to 1991. In the middle of my briefing, which only lasted a few minutes, the minister suddenly fell asleep. Possibly he was very tired. What to do? I was there to brief the defence minister, but nobody had briefed me on how actually to carry it out. Fortunately, the director of the service to which I then belonged was in the room, and he was experienced in this kind of situation. He immediately asked, in a very loud voice, a non-essential question. The sudden – and loud – interruption, by a different voice, made all the difference. The minister was with us again, and the briefing continued. And I learned that a briefing is not only about facts and assessments, but something more similar to showmanship, a theatrical performance.

These reminiscences should not be interpreted as evidence that Swedish senior policy makers failed to show an interest in intelligence briefings. Far from it. Yet, it could be argued that interest in intelligence to a high degree, and quite naturally, depended on the policy maker's interest in foreign policy. Three Swedish prime ministers requested, and received, regular briefings by the intelligence services. These were:

- Tage Erlander, Prime Minister 1946–1969
- Olof Palme, Prime Minister 1969–1976 and 1982–1986
- Carl Bildt, Prime Minister 1991–1994

Few, if any, other prime ministers showed the same level of interest, and the explanation was, no doubt, that they were not as active in foreign policy. Moreover, it is unlikely

that contemporary prime ministers would have reason to display a similar interest. With EU membership in 1995, a feeling emerged in senior government that, henceforth, there were indeed few foreign policy issues on which there was a *need* to have an opinion (which did not, of course, prevent foreign issues from being raised in political debates primarily intended for domestic consumption).

In retrospect, the years following the end of the Cold War and beginning of EU membership suggest a sense of loss of mission for the Swedish intelligence community. The Soviet threat was gone. With EU membership, many in government believed that Sweden no longer needed foreign intelligence. The disappearance of the Soviet threat also led to a widespread feeling that there was little need for armed forces. It followed that there was also little need for military intelligence. The intelligence services increasingly came to be seen as political liabilities, and regulation became far more important than intelligence results. This would perhaps have been understandable had there been any major abuse of intelligence powers. However, none had taken place since the registration of political extremists back in the early 1970s. Perhaps it was simply the rhetoric of righteousness in combination with the lack of obvious foreign threats to national security that persuaded a new generation of political leaders that intelligence was, like war itself, something that ought to be confined to museums. A certain surge in interest in intelligence resumed with Carl Bildt's return to government as Foreign Minister from 2006 to 2014. However, it was not sustained by succeeding governments.

Prime ministers and intelligence briefings in Sweden

Below will follow several case studies of how prime ministers Erlander, Palme, and Bildt received intelligence briefings and used intelligence output. The case studies will show how the political style of the policy maker determined the usage of intelligence in Sweden. They will also explain why there was no politicization debate comparable to the one in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Furthermore, they illustrate how the 'use or misuse' label really depended on results achieved.

Case study 1: Sweden turns toward the West

The Polish elections in 1946 and 1947

In the years immediately following the Second World War, it was not always obvious how relations would develop between the victorious powers, and in particular those between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was also difficult to learn firsthand what took place behind the Iron Curtain. Prime Minister Tage Erlander frequently had to turn to intelligence for the information that he needed to chart Sweden's political course during this period of flux. Erlander, a Social Democrat, needed intelligence verification of events reported by the media and casual observers.

This became particularly obvious during the Polish elections in 1946 and 1947.[7] First came the Polish people's referendum on 30 June 1946, also known as the 'Three Times

[7]Michael Fredholm, "Trust, but Verify: The Verification Role of Signals Intelligence – Then for Decision-makers, Now for Historians," (International Conference: Need to Know IV: What We Know about Secret Services in the Cold War – A State of Affairs 25 Years after 1989 International Conference, Leuven, October 23–24, 2014).

Yes' referendum, on the abolition of the Senate, the new economic system, and the territorial demands of the new Poland. Three questions were asked:

(1) Are you in favour of abolishing the Senate?
(2) Do you want consolidation, in the future constitution of the economic system founded on agricultural reform and the nationalization of basic national industries, while maintaining the preservation of the statutory rights of private enterprise?
(3) Do you want to perpetuate the western borders of the Polish state on the Baltic Sea and the Oder-Neisse line?

The pro-communist block demanded a resounding 'yes' to all three questions, hence the popular name of the 'Three Times Yes' referendum, which was seen as a means of deciding whether the Polish electorate supported or opposed communism. However, the communists already controlled much of the government, including the Polish and Soviet army units, police, and the security service. By these means, the referendum results were manipulated. Official results indicated that of 13,160,451 eligible voters, a total of 11,857,986 had voted. There had been 327,435 invalid votes. This left a total of 11,530,551 valid votes. As for the three questions, the result appeared clear-cut and gave the impression of being a resounding victory for the communist bloc[8]:

Question 1.
For: 7,844,522
Against: 3,686,029

Question 2.
For: 8,896,105
Against: 2,634,446

Question 3.
For: 10,534,697
Against: 995,854

The election was, accordingly, a decisive victory, or so the paramount Soviet newspaper *Pravda* claimed. Swedish newspapers trusted *Pravda* so news reporting presented a rosy picture of the situation.

Reality was quite different. There were protests against the referendum manipulation, yet the full extent of the fraud was only published after the fall of communism in Poland.[9] For the Swedish political leadership, there was no way of knowing how the election had been carried out based on news reports and diplomatic reporting. However, the Swedish national SIGINT agency FRA had monitored Polish encrypted military communications at the time. These intercepts offered a completely different picture of the referendum results. To merely give

[8]Pravda, 13 July 1946, 4. The report was marked and dated Warsaw, 12 July.
[9]Nikita V. Petrov, "Rol' MGB SSSR v sovetizatsii Pol'shi," *Stalin i kholodyaya voyna* (Moscow: Institut vseobshchey istorii, Rossiyskaya akademiya nauk, 1998), http://bbb.livejournal.com/1269125.html.

a sample from one voting district, as confirmed by FRA SIGINT based on Polish encrypted military communications:

Question 1.
For: 1,464
Against: 7,701

Question 2.
For: 3,354
Against: 5,831

Question 3.
For: 7,391
Against: 1,786

The intercepts showed that in reality, it was only question 3 that had received a 'yes' vote. In addition, FRA reported that the referendum officials in the district were ordered 'not to communicate' the results. The pro-communist block had accordingly lost the election, yet it had managed to manipulate the result so that the world believed it decisively had won the support of the Polish electorate.

For Prime Minister Erlander, a first difficulty in assessing the situation was that the Swedish press had not been particularly interested in the referendum. On 30 June 1946, the date of the referendum, the Swedish daily *Dagens Nyheter* had not mentioned the referendum at all. On the following day, the daily did indeed mention the referendum. Referring to Radio Warsaw, the daily reported that the Left had been the clear winner according to preliminary referendum results. The daily also noted that the referendum had been carried out everywhere in calm and order.[10] Yet the Swedish press on 3 July mentioned that the Polish opposition was critical to the referendum results.[11] A renewed discussion of the referendum result only followed on 13 July, after the official referendum results had been released.[12] And by then, the Swedish press trusted *Pravda* and the Soviet take on the situation.

Similar events, and news media assessments, followed during the Polish parliamentary elections held on 19 January 1947. Again the election results were manipulated, but again the FRA reporting was able to present the realities of the elections. Voters had to suffer intimidation and violence if they persisted in voting for the wrong candidates. The FRA reporting was based on telegrams from the Internal Security Corps (Polish: *Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*, KBW) under the Ministry of Public Security. These telegrams instructed the security troops to search the shirt-sleeves of the voters so that they did not hide opposition ballots there. The FRA particularly noted intimidation of the voters for the Polish People's (or Peasant) Party 'Nowe Wyzwolenie' ('New Liberation;' Polish: *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe 'Nowe Wyzwolenie'*), which in the official election results ended up with only 3.5 per cent of the vote.[13]

[10] *Dagens Nyheter*, 1 July 1946, 7.
[11] *Dagens Nyheter*, 3 July 1946, 10.
[12] *Dagens Nyheter*, 13 July 1946, 1, 5.
[13] Oddly enough, this party was not, in fact, a genuine opposition party, but a front set up by communists as a make-believe opposition. Personal communication from Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski, Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Science, Poland, 24 October 2014. The orders from the Internal Security Corps would seem to indicate that the Ministry of Public Security, too, fell for the party line and acted against what they believed was a genuine opposition party.

Several people who advocated opposition parties such as the *Nowe Wyzwolenie* were arrested. Election officials simply disregarded the votes for the opposition when they reported in the final results, even though this meant that up to 85 per cent of the votes were simply ignored.

The Swedish press had not attempted to find out much about the elections, and if anything, it had in a quite biased manner assumed that the opposition, unlike the communists, would be violent. To take but one example, the influential Swedish daily *Dagens Nyheter* had reported little from the elections. On 19 January, the day of the elections, the daily reported that the Polish security service had found a combat order from the Polish underground on how the elections would be sabotaged. It also mentioned that several members of the local election committees and security personnel had been assassinated, implicitly by the Polish underground opposition.[14] On the following day, *Dagens Nyheter* reported on the front page that the elections had, according to the official reports, been carried out in good order and the ruling party was assumed to have won with a considerable majority.[15] On page 12, the newspaper went so far as to state that according to reports which had reached the daily during the previous evening (which were implicitly described as reports from independent observers since they were not labelled as official), there had been no disturbances during the elections in most parts of the country.[16] Finally, on 22 January, the daily reported that the ruling parties had received 383 of the 444 seats in parliament.[17] The *Dagens Nyheter* neither commented nor reflected on why the elections had produced this result.

Policy effect

So what was Prime Minister Erlander to believe? He did not buy the *Pravda* point of view, but, as noted, turned to intelligence for a second take on the situation. Or possibly, intelligence turned to him to report. FRA representatives met Erlander to brief him on their findings. This briefing, and subsequent reporting, enabled Erlander's Social Democrat government to assess the real situation of politics in Soviet-controlled Poland and to base its policies on fact, not on newspaper reporting.

The briefing took place four days after the elections. Erlander noted in his personal diary that the FRA had intercepted a series of encrypted telegrams relating to the Polish elections. The results were first reported orally to the Prime Minister in a personal briefing, and the revelations shook him deeply.[18] Erlander noted in his diary: 'The election methods were exposed with terrible exactness – "investigate so that they do not hide an opposition ballot up their shirtsleeves." So this is the nice election which even our press was duped into believing in.'[19]

The FRA reporting thus greatly influenced Erlander in his understanding of events in Poland and elsewhere in Soviet-held Europe. While the FRA briefing on the Polish elections was not the only event that shaped the Erlander government's opinion about

[14] *Dagens Nyheter*, 19 January 1947, 16.
[15] *Dagens Nyheter*, 20 January 1947, 1.
[16] Ibid., 12.
[17] *Dagens Nyheter*, 22 January 1947, 9.
[18] Erlander was briefed orally on 23 January 1947. The written report, currently available in the FRA archive, was only issued on 3 February 1947. Tage Erlander, *Dagböcker 1945–1949* (Hedemora: Gidlunds, 2001), 160–161; Jan-Olof Grahn, *FRA och det kalla krigets början: Signalunderrättelsetjänsten 1945–1960* (Bromma: FRA, Historiska skrifter 20, 2013), 24.
[19] Erlander, *Dagböcker 1945–1949*, 160–161. Translation from the original Swedish.

events in Soviet-occupied Europe, it is clear from Erlander's diaries that the reporting affected him profoundly. Moreover, the briefing was the first in the series of events that came to influence Swedish foreign policy (subsequent ones were the communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and the ominous Soviet invitation to Finland in the same month to sign an agreement of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance, subsequently known as the YYA Treaty, which would provide for consultations on securing the defence of both countries, in effect a means for the Soviet Union to base troops in Finland). It would not be an overstatement to suggest that the FRA reporting influenced the Swedish government's choice of foreign policy, turning it further towards the Western powers. SIGINT reporting was the only source on the election results available at the time. The case was, accordingly, one in which a senior Swedish policy maker used intelligence reporting in the way it was intended, with intelligence 'informing policy, not prescribing policy.'[20] Yet, as will be shown when we return to the particulars of this briefing, below, the FRA briefer, a certain Andersson, did not aim for the role of flawless civil servant during the briefing process.

Case Study 2: Sweden increases military and intelligence cooperation with the West

The defection of Soviet Lieutenant Ilya Muchek in 1949

Two years after the FRA report on the Polish election methods, Prime Minister Erlander again had reason to attend intelligence briefings. This time it was Swedish military intelligence that needed to inform, and receive the blessings of, the Prime Minister.

On 18 May 1949, Soviet Air Force Second Lieutenant Ilya Muchek defected to Sweden, flying across the Baltic in a Lavochkin La-11 fighter.[21] Sweden had not yet reintroduced a comprehensive air defense system, so the new arrival turned up at the Swedish air base F 18 in Tullinge, near the capital Stockholm, without warning. The Lavochkin La-11 was one of the last propeller-driven Soviet fighter aircraft. Lieutenant Muchek had flown across the Baltic to Sweden from the Estonian island of Hiiumaa or Saaremaa. Muchek himself came from Mogilev in Belarus. He had reportedly navigated across the Baltic with the help of a map in a pocket calendar. For this reason, he was unsure about his position, and the aircraft did not survive the landing. Muchek suffered no wounds, however, and asked for political asylum. The Soviet embassy reacted quickly and demanded that the aircraft and pilot be repatriated to the motherland. The Swedish government promised to return the aircraft. Nonetheless, the Swedish Air Force and Defense Research Establishment (*Försvarets forskningsanstalt*, FOA) first examined the aircraft. Despite the La-11 being an old model, the examination resulted in the conclusion that avionics were comparatively new and Swedish technical intelligence assessed it as being of higher quality than expected. The aircraft had both a radar warning receiver (RWR) and an identification friend/foe (IFF) system.[22]

[20]McLaughlin, "Serving the National Policymaker," 85.
[21]Michael Fredholm, "Migrants in Uniform as Intelligence Assets: Polish and Soviet Naval Aviation and Air Force Defectors to Sweden during the Cold War," (International Conference: Need to Know VI: Intelligence and Migration, Karlskrona, November 17–18, 2016).
[22]*Vestkusten* (San Francisco; Swedish-language weekly), 26 May 1949; *Flight*, 14 July 1949; Jerk Fehling, *Flygunderrättelseboken: Inblickar i flygteknik och underrättelsetjänst* (n.p., 2007), 228; Lennart Andersson, *Fienden i öster! Svenskt jaktflyg under kalla kriget* (Stockholm: SMB, 2012), 35.

Besides, Muchek offered to carry out intelligence work against the Soviet Union, or at least to hand over Soviet military secrets. Muchek's defection was already from the outset handled as a foreign intelligence matter, so the Swedish security service was not involved. There is no file related to Muchek in the security service archive. Muchek's case reached the highest levels of Swedish government when Prime Minister Erlander personally took charge of the matter. Erlander was privately disgusted by Muchek's motives but nonetheless oversaw his clandestine release to British intelligence and departure from Sweden. This much is clear from Erlander's personal diary. On 1 June 1949, Erlander wrote:

> I was not quite satisfied with the solution proposed by [Foreign Minister Östen] Undén and [Interior Minister Eije] Mossberg on how to handle the problem with the Russian pilot. That the Russian is an extremely unpleasant individual who without hesitation betrays his country is a matter that should not deprive him of his right to asylum. But to put him in touch with the English spy network does not please me, yet I gave in when I understood that we cannot prevent him from making contact on his own or leaving the country on his own initiative.[23]

Discussions continued for several days, with both British and American intelligence. On 10 June 1949, Erlander concluded:

> I felt considerable hesitation when I yesterday accepted the Undén-Mossberg proposal with regard to the Russian pilot. It cannot be wise that the Swedish military involves itself in the recruitment of spies for the United States, even if much unpleasantness thus can be avoided. However, now it is done and we only have to await the front pages in the American press.[24]

The Swedish government had early on decided to offer Muchek asylum. However, the Soviets also pressed charges for, in particular, Muchek's desertion and theft and demolition of a military aircraft. The unpleasantness referred to by Erlander was no doubt the eventual prosecution and possible extradition of Muchek for these crimes, something which would violate his right to asylum. Besides, Muchek had already, as is clear from Erlander's diary, expressed a wish to make contact with British intelligence.

But even this was not the full story. On 9 June, a solution had been found. Only hinted at in Erlander's diary, the full explanation comes in a report from the British embassy in Stockholm. On 10 June, the British embassy reported to London that the Swedish authorities two days ago had decided to give Muchek asylum, but that the Soviet government wanted Muchek extradited on basis of a criminal charge. The Swedes had handled the matter of Muchek in the following way:

> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs have told the Swedish Air Force that there would be no objection to his disappearing between the time of release and re-arrest. The Swedish Air Force first approached the United States Embassy who were willing to co-operate in removing him to safety but late yesterday received instructions from the State Department that nothing could be done.

As a result, the

> Swedish Air Force accordingly approached us. They have made all arrangements to send the pilot in a Swedish aircraft to an airport in Germany and asked that the Air Ministry representative who has been working here with the Swedish authorities on the interrogation

[23]Erlander, *Dagböcker 1945–1949*, 359 (1 June 1949). Translation from the Swedish original.
[24]Ibid., 364 (10 June 1949).

> of the pilot, should travel in the same aircraft to ensure that no difficulties arise over reception in Germany.[25]

Several telegrams on this issue were dispatched to London on the same day, and it indeed appears that Muchek was flown out of Sweden by the Swedish Air Force. Having arrived at a military base in West Germany, the Swedes handed Muchek over to the British Air Ministry, which indeed passed him on to the Americans. The handover may have taken place in Wiesbaden, where the Swedish Air Force maintained contacts with U.S. intelligence.[26]

By this roundabout way, a variety of goals were reached. First, as implied by the British telegram, British intelligence had already participated in the interrogation of Muchek, who had handed over at least some of his military secrets. Second, Muchek reached American intelligence, which seems to have been his wish from the outset. Third, Sweden granted Muchek asylum but avoided having him in the country. Fourth, any criminal charges could be evaded, since Muchek voluntarily had left the country before being re-arrested. What the Soviets thought about the matter remains unknown to outside observers. They cannot have failed to understand at least some of the developments, since Erlander had been right in his expectation that the American press would report the matter. Although the defection did not merit any real headlines, the incident was covered in the American and international press. The *New York Times* published an interview with Muchek already on 11 June 1949.[27] On 12 June, the press reported that Muchek had been granted asylum, a residence permit and an alien's passport in Sweden. The press did not disclose Muchek's then whereabouts, only that he was being cared for 'by friends' – a statement no doubt acceptable to Erlander who assuredly knew that Muchek by then was in Germany or on his way to the United States. The press also reported that the aircraft had been returned to the Soviet Union a few days earlier, after a thorough examination by the Swedish authorities, who were understood to have 'gained valuable information on technical details.'[28]

Policy effect

Swedish intelligence already cooperated with British and American intelligence and had indeed done so since the Second World War. However, the Muchek case pushed the issue of further intelligence cooperation to the level that it became a cabinet matter. Since the Prime Minister personally approved the increased level of cooperation, military intelligence could increase collaboration with the Western powers to a higher level despite Sweden's official non-alignment policy. It is not known exactly how military intelligence briefed Erlander. However, the affair gives the impression that Erlander not only wanted to be briefed, he was also prepared to take an active part in the decision of what to do with Muchek. So although we do not know how the intelligence was presented to the Prime Minister, it seems clear that Erlander used the intelligence to formulate a policy that enabled the intensification of Sweden's military and intelligence cooperation with the West.

[25]TNA, FO371/77731 (TOP SECRET), dispatch from Anthony Lambert (1911–2007), the British Embassy in Stockholm, to the Foreign office, London, 10 June 1949. Kindly made available by Dick van der Aart.
[26]Niklas Wikström, *Den svenska militära underrättelsetjänsten 1948–1956* (Stockholm: FHS, 2006).
[27]Dick van der Aart, *MiG's op de vlucht: Vliegtuigdeserteurs in de Koude Oorlog* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009), 53; citing *New York Times*, 11 June 1949.
[28]*Brooklyn Daily Eagle* (Brooklyn, New York), 12 June 1949; *Nebraska State Journal* (Lincoln, Nebraska), 13 June 1949; *Straits Times* (Singapore), 13 June 1949.

This was, no doubt, a prudent move. In September 1948, the U.S. President Harry Truman had decided on what relations to adopt to the Scandinavian countries. Norway and Denmark were by then formally aligning themselves with the Western powers, and the United States would support this by all appropriate measures. However, Truman had decided to 'make perfectly clear to Sweden our dissatisfaction with its apparent failure to discriminate in its own mind and its future planning between the West and the Soviet Union; [and] to influence Sweden to abandon this attitude of subjective neutrality and look toward eventual alignment with other Western Powers.'

Moreover, and yet more importantly, in case of Soviet military aggression, 'Sweden's requirements would be considered only after those of countries which have given indication of intention to cooperate with the U.S. or Brussels Treaty signatories in security arrangements.'[29] In other words, Sweden had already chosen the West, not the East, yet had failed to align formally with the Western powers. As a result, Sweden would not receive the U.S. military support it needed in case a war broke out. No wonder that Erlander chose to increase Sweden's informal military and intelligence cooperation with the United States.

Case study 3: Prime Minister Palme orders the establishment of a communication channel to Moscow

The proposed U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe in 1971

Erlander, a Social Democrat, had never regarded foreign policy as his primary interest which was the expansion of the domestic public sector into a strong welfare state fuelled by high taxation. However, regardless of personal beliefs, he had kept abreast of international events and for this reason consistently chose to follow a cautious but essentially pro-Western policy. His successor Olof Palme, another Social Democrat, was quite different in character. Ruling as Prime Minister from 1969 to 1976 and from 1982 to 1986, Palme was fascinated by intelligence but trusted only his own judgment. In fact, from 1951 to 1953 Palme was an informant for military intelligence during his travels in East bloc countries.[30] And from 1953 to 1954, Palme, then a cavalry lieutenant in the reserve, himself served in military intelligence, in Section II of the Defence Staff which was the intelligence section. Palme only left when the opportunity emerged to become the political secretary of Prime Minister Erlander.[31]

In Section II, Palme worked together with Birger Elmér, who later, with the help of Palme, became the head of the HUMINT service, the IB. As Prime Minister, Palme received regular briefings from the IB. However, presumably for political reasons he eschewed formal meetings and briefings and instead met Elmér on the tennis court, both men being avid tennis players. On the tennis court, Elmér briefed Palme on the latest intelligence and Palme told Elmér what he wanted done. The tennis court meetings in time turned into a public secret, and a KGB officer of Latvian origin then stationed in Sweden, Nikolaj Nejland, bugged the café next to the tennis court in order to learn what Sweden was up to.[32]

[29]U.S. National Security Council, The Position of the United States with Respect to Scandinavia, NSC 28/1 (TOP SECRET), approved by the President on 4 September 1948. Declassified and available from the Office of the Historian, Department of State.
[30]Lars Olof Lampers, *Det grå brödraskapet: En berättelse om IB* (SOU 2002:92), 491.
[31]Henrik Berggren, *Underbara dagar framför oss: En biografi över Olof Palme* (Stockholm: Norstedts, 2010), 218, 230–31.
[32]Wilhelm Agrell, *Sprickor i järnridån: Svensk underrättelsetjänst 1944–1992* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2017), 198–9, with references.

One of Palme's first major foreign policy assessments concerned the balance of power in Europe. In May 1971, U.S. Senator Mike Mansfield, an anti-war Democrat from Montana, proposed a 50 per cent withdrawal of U.S. troops deployed in Europe by the end of the year. His proposal was introduced as an amendment to the Selective Service Bill (HR 6531), which meant that the amendment, if approved, would have the force of law.[33]

Senator Mansfield had made similar proposals in the past, most recently in December 1969, so the proposed amendment did not come out of the blue. Yet, it appears that Prime Minister Palme had received some kind of advance warning. Moreover, based on his subsequent actions, it would seem clear that Palme was convinced that the United States would withdraw substantial forces from Europe.

Expecting a coming power vacuum in Europe, Palme feared that Sweden because of its geographical location then would fall under the influence of the Soviet power. For this reason, Palme saw a need to establish contact with the Soviets in advance.[34]

Policy effect

As a result, Palme on 2 February 1971 ordered the IB to establish a communication channel with the Soviet security and intelligence service, the KGB. The head of the IB, Elmér, and the head of the security service, the security department of the National Police Board (RPS/Säk), Hans Holmér, discussed whether the communications channel should be established by the IB or the security service.[35]

However, the Mansfield amendment was defeated. No U.S. troop withdrawal took place. Since the security service disliked the Soviets, distrusted Palme, and in any case did not wish to harm its highly valued link to the CIA, the exclusive meetings with which were regarded as prestigious and thereby highly desirable by the security service chiefs, no communications were opened with the KGB.

Case study 4: Sweden plays both sides

Sweden's Vietnam policy in 1972-1975

Although few details are available, Prime Minister Palme appears to have expressed an interest in intelligence on North Vietnam. This was unsurprising; Palme rode on a popular wave of sympathy for the North Vietnamese struggle against what most leftists perceived to be an imperialist superpower. Sweden was, in January 1969, the first Western country that recognized North Vietnam. In March 1970, two senior Swedish Social Democrat party officials, party secretary Sten Andersson and the party's international secretary Pierre Schori, made an extended visit to North Vietnam. Their trip resulted in a confidential report to the Social Democrat party leadership. It has been suggested that this report was handed over to the IB and from the IB, to the CIA.[36] Schori later said that before the trip to Vietnam, Elmér asked him to provide intelligence based on his observations there, since the IB needed information for use in the intelligence

[33]*New York Times*, 12 May 1971; Péter Lázár, *The Mansfield Amendments and the U.S. Commitment in Europe, 1966–1975* (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, Thesis, 2003), 13–14.
[34]Peter Bratt, "Olof Palme ville arbeta med CIA," *Fokus* 43, 2 November 2011 (www.fokus.se/2011/11/%c2%bbolof-palme-ville-arbeta-med-cia%c2%ab).
[35]Ibid.; Olof Frånstedt, *Spionjägaren 2: Säpo, IB och Palme* (n.p.: Ica Bokförlag, 2014), 60–61.
[36]Staffan Thorsell, *Sverige i Vita huset* (n.p.: Bonnier Fakta, 2004), 200. Thorsell is a journalist and newspaper editor.

exchange with U.S. intelligence. Schori claimed that he refused; however, the security service's counterespionage chief Frånstedt claimed that Schori did report to the IB during his various international assignments for the Social Democrat party.[37] Since the reporting formally went to the party leadership, there is probably no way to confirm the link, if any, between Schori, Andersson, and Elmér through archival sources. Nonetheless, it appears that Prime Minister Palme received his report on North Vietnam, and that the report subsequently ended up in the intelligence exchange between the IB and the CIA. Moreover, Palme was not averse to establishing informal intelligence structures, including through the Social Democrat party and non-intelligence branches of the civil service, to augment the formal, national intelligence structures.

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, Swedish domestic politics took a sharp turn to the left. Palme was not slow to take advantage of the prevailing political climate. On 23 December 1972, he gave a speech on Swedish national radio where he compared the ongoing U.S. bombings of Hanoi to atrocities such as Guernica during the Spanish Civil War and even Nazi Germany's extermination of Jews at Treblinka.[38] The US government of President Nixon regarded the comparison as a gross insult and froze its diplomatic relations with Sweden. Sweden were told that its new ambassador would not be welcome for the present and that the American chargé d'affaires would not be returning to Stockholm. The *New York Times* concluded, no doubt correctly, that one reason for Palme's speech was to regain support for the scheduled parliamentary elections of 1973, since the Social Democrat party had seen its share of the electorate fall during the year. By attacking the United States in public, and by being singled out as a U.S. adversary, Palme managed to gain the support, and votes, of the leftist anti-American political wave that then swept through Sweden.[39] In effect, the angry U.S. reaction elevated Palme from the position of the leader of a small, formally unaligned country to that of a senior international player.

Palme was, no doubt, well aware of his public façade. Because in intelligence policy, out of the public eye, Palme expressed quite a different side of his personality. He ordered both military commander-in-chief Stig Synnergren and IB head Elmér to make sure that his political activities did not impact on the military cooperation between Sweden and the United States. He also told Elmér that since Sweden had a good reputation and contacts in North Vietnam, they should take advantage of their Vietnamese links to provide intelligence on North Vietnam to the United States. In addition, there is (unconfirmed) information that he ordered the IB to hand over to its U.S. partners the names of those American deserters (some 400 by late 1969) who had applied for asylum in Sweden.[40]

Moreover, this was not the last time that Swedish intelligence on North Vietnam was disseminated to the United States. In November 1974, foreign minister Sven Andersson had intelligence passed to the United States on North Vietnamese troop movements directed against South Vietnam, which he had received from Swedish intelligence. In April 1975, he provided warning about the North Vietnamese final offensive, which

[37] Pierre Schori, *Minnet och elden: En politisk memoar med samtida synpunkter* (Stockholm: Leopard, 2014), 334. However, the security service's counterespionage chief Frånstedt noted that both Schori and his predecessor as the party's international secretary Anders Thunborg were IB informants. Olof Frånstedt, *Spionjägaren 1: Bland agenter, terrorister och affärer* (n.p.: Ica Bokförlag, 2013), 184.

[38] *Lunchekot*, Swedish national radio/Sveriges Radio, 23 December 1972.

[39] *New York Times*, 8 January 1973.

[40] Bratt, "Olof Palme,".

eventually led to the fall of Saigon and caused an end to the war.[41] Although this intelligence ultimately was to no avail, it showed the continuity of Swedish intelligence cooperation with the United States throughout Palme's period as prime minister.

Policy effect

Unlike the previous cases examined in this paper, which concerned real security threats to Sweden in its geographical neighbourhood, the Swedish interests in North Vietnam were hardly sufficiently important to motivate a major intelligence collection effort. It follows that Sweden's real need for intelligence on North Vietnam was as a means for intelligence exchange, with U.S. intelligence, on other topics and no doubt with a primary focus on the Soviet threat. This was surely needed, since Palme played both sides in the conflict. In effect, he used intelligence to maintain balance in his foreign policy, which was necessary because of his anti-American rhetoric which largely was produced for a domestic audience. Meanwhile, Palme used party cadres such as Sten Andersson and Pierre Schori to collect intelligence through informal structures that subsequently was used by the IB through official channels. Palme's use of individuals who were not directly linked to the intelligence services, but must have been selected by himself because of their loyalty, for intelligence activities formed a pattern that would return during Palme's second period as prime minister, from 1982 to 1986.

The Post-Palme period

For several years after Palme's death, Swedish prime ministers showed limited interest in intelligence results, or indeed what the intelligence community was working on at the time. There are no indications that they requested intelligence briefings on anything but basic matters. Since this was a period during which a number of air and subsea incidents took place, in or near Swedish air space and territorial waters, this sounds like an astounding, some might say incredible, conclusion. Yet, when General Bengt Gustafsson, military commander-in-chief from 1986 to 1994, briefed the government, which he did regularly, he received neither comments nor tasks for the military intelligence service until Carl Bildt in 1991 became Prime Minister. 'So one often felt as if acting in a vacuum,' Gustafsson concluded.[42]

For sure, intelligence briefings to cabinet ministers took place, including the one in which the present writer participated in 1986. But prime ministers tended to have business elsewhere, so in most cases it was the ministers of defence and, occasionally, foreign affairs who were briefed. As noted, even they might choose to send their state secretaries instead. Intelligence played a key role for the Swedish civil service's understanding of national security in this crucial period; yet, the senior policy makers were absent. It is possible that they were satisfied with the media take on international affairs.

This situation did not change until Carl Bildt became Prime Minister in 1991, at the very end of the Cold War. Bildt was an avid reader of intelligence reporting, and he frequently requested, and received, intelligence briefings. Bildt had a keen interest in the

[41]Thorsell, *Sverige i Vita huset*, 200.

[42]Bo Hugemark (ed.), *Fel sort och för mycket? Arméns avvägningsfrågor under det kalla kriget-Vittnesseminarium armén 16 September 2004* (Stockholm: Försvarsshögskolan, 2004), 41. Translation from the Swedish original, which is a transcript of a series of testimonies by senior policy makers on issues for which no documents were archived.

Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. During the 1989–1991 Baltic independence movement, Swedish intelligence had a good grasp of Soviet activities there. Moreover, Swedish military intelligence, from 1991 onwards, assisted the three Baltic states.[43] By this time, Bertil Lundin (1946–2005) was the chief of operations for the Swedish HUMINT service, the KSI. Upon Lundin's death some years later, Bildt wrote his obituary, in which he revealed that they had been good friends for many years.[44] In other words, the relationship between Bildt and Lundin was similar to the one previously between Palme and Elmér. There is, accordingly, little doubt that Bildt received briefings during his time in office.

Politicization or policy?

Even by the time of Erlander, it was not customary for a Swedish prime minister personally to direct the activities of the intelligence agencies. In 1974, this principle was enshrined in law. Since then, Swedish law prohibits the prime minister from personally directing the intelligence agencies. The same goes for each cabinet minister, including those in charge of defence and foreign affairs. While a department of government (a ministry), such as the ministry of defence, is under the direct control of a cabinet minister, the administrative authorities (government agencies) under the ministry are supposedly autonomous. A cabinet minister is indeed expressly prohibited from intervening in matters relating to the application of the law or the due exercise of an administrative authority's power against an individual or municipality within its field of responsibility. Any attempt by a cabinet minister to intervene would be labelled ministerial rule, which is a violation of the Instrument of Government that since 1974 forms the foundation of every Swedish government. Nor are administrative authorities allowed expressly to direct each other.[45] With regard to the intelligence agencies, the result is that a cabinet minister may 'tell them what to achieve, not what to do.'[46]

Despite the legislation, it was not unknown for prime ministers with an active interest in foreign policy to disregard tradition and legal regime and actively task intelligence. Palme, as we have seen, certainly directed his intelligence chiefs on his own, in contradiction of previous tradition.

Furthermore, Erlander, Palme, and Bildt all attended briefings, told intelligence what to achieve, and used the intelligence output, each according to his political style, for policy making. Politicization certainly took place, but it did so on the level of policy makers, not intelligence analysts.

Yet, there is little doubt that the intelligence briefings were beneficial to government as a whole, primarily because of the ability of briefings to improve quality of decision-making by reducing ignorance. Intelligence briefings certainly assisted Erlander in

[43]Thomas Lundén and Torbjörn Nilsson (eds), *Sverige och Baltikums frigörelse: Två vittnesseminarier om storpolitik kring Östersjön 1989–1994* (Huddinge: Södertörn University College, Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, 2008), 124 (Swedish intelligence on Soviet activities in the Baltic states), 127 (Swedish intelligence support), 150–51 (Bildt's role). A transcript of a series of testimonies by senior policy makers on issues for which no documents were archived.
[44]*Dagens Nyheter*, 15 July 2005.
[45]The Instrument of Government, Chapter 12, Article 2. In Swedish: Kungörelse (1974:152) om beslutad ny regeringsform; Lag (2010:1408) om ändring i regeringsformen, 12 kap., 2 §.
[46]Gregory F. Treverton, Memorandum, 'Briefing' Decisionmakers workshop, Stockholm, 7–8 May 2014 (RAND Corporation and Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies, CATS), 12.

reducing ignorance, since Erlander fundamentally was uninterested in foreign policy and saw it as a distraction to what he really wanted to achieve, which was the building of a strong welfare state. That Erlander aligned Sweden's foreign policy with that of the Western world showed more of his strength as a policy maker and statesman than his personal inclinations.

On the other hand, sometimes the policymaker is the real expert. Both Palme and Bildt were genuine foreign policy experts. Although both received frequent and regular intelligence briefings, they relied on their own judgment far more than did Erlander in essentially the same role, that is, the formulation of Swedish foreign policy.

Instead of the issue of politicization, the Swedish intelligence tradition focused on a quite different potential problem, explicitly that of the civil service tradition. Was the intelligence officer a traditional civil servant, who would deal with all issues with equal diligence and lack of personal opinion? And was the intelligence service an institution of government that operated within the civil service tradition of independent administrative authorities, each with its field of responsibility and each operating independently of other authorities?

Conclusion

There was, within the traditional civil service, a deeply rooted belief in the model of the flawless civil servant who would deal with all responsibilities, whether major or minor, significant or insignificant, with equal care and diligence. However, the case studies presented above show that the personal characteristics of the analysts and briefers of the intelligence service were far more important for the credibility of the service than the old civil service ethos, which fundamentally encouraged the following of procedures and cared little for a problem's urgency.

There was also a deeply held belief in the reliability of the institutional dissemination procedure which characterized the civil service tradition. When the intelligence service disseminated an anonymized intelligence product through official channels it expected, and wanted to believe, that the recipient would assimilate the conclusions of the disseminated product. However, as we have seen this was often far from the case, and reality was immeasurably more complex than the utopian values of the civil service tradition. Often considerably more than a disseminated product was needed to get the intelligence it contained the attention it deserved. This was known within Swedish intelligence from the very outset, yet the pious tradition of the civil service remained a matter of core belief within broad segments of Swedish intelligence for many years. In other countries, the recipient might have been referred to as a customer, the intelligence service may have claimed to engage in customer relations, and it may actively have attempted to sell in its product. 'Salesmanship is part of the game; intelligence is not an impersonal delivery process,' argued the British SIGINT practitioner and Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee in the Cabinet Office, Michael Herman.[47] Some Swedish intelligence officers would not wish to agree, but eventually a similar way of thinking emerged within Swedish intelligence as well. 'Intelligence is presentation!' concluded Lars Ulfving, who worked for Swedish military intelligence in the period 1978–1998 and later found a position with

[47]Herman, *Intelligence Power*, 45–6.

the Defence University.[48] For important intelligence, and in particular any reporting that broke new ground or signified shifts in paradigm, far more was needed to persuade the customer that the reported conclusions were important than just handing over an impersonal written report. The conclusions not only had to be presented but also must be presented in a manner that had an impact. For this purpose, the oral briefing was in most cases vital to gain attention. The role played by the intelligence service in this regard approached what can only, in the serious sense of the term, be referred to as show business, and the briefer had to display the manners of a successful showman.

This was, for instance, the case when Prime Minister Erlander in January 1947 was informed about events during the Polish election four days earlier, a briefing that played its part in moving Sweden to a policy in support of the Western powers, and against the Soviet Union which until then had enjoyed a certain level of goodwill as the socialist member of the victorious coalition that defeated Nazi Germany. It was the oral briefing by the not further identified Andersson from the FRA that convinced Prime Minister Erlander that the events during the election were important, and that a shift in paradigm had occurred. Important policy makers seldom read written reports. Nor did Erlander; in fact, he received the oral briefing more than a week before the written report was finalized.[49] This was hardly unusual, since for a policy maker, it is far more important to receive an oral briefing when the information is needed than a written report, then or later.[50]

With regard to the aforementioned risk that the policy maker would choose not to take in the intelligence report but stay with his or her existing opinions or prejudices, or trust his or her personal expertise, there was still one way to get through to the policy maker. During an oral briefing, the briefer was able to assess the strength of the policy maker's prejudices and present the intelligence assessment in a manner that took these prejudices into account. Was this objectivity in the old civil service tradition? Not quite, but some in this situation would argue in favour of subtly emphasizing those conclusions that the intelligence service assessed to be credible but knew that the policy maker did *not* want to hear. This might in the end be the only way of paving the ground for a decision that rested on something more than the policy maker's prejudices. As a result, the briefer became more like an educator and showman than flawless civil servant and assumed the mantle of a teacher, who saw his or her professional role as imparting knowledge to those who lacked it. While in some ways far from the civil service ethos, this contributed to rational decisions based on facts and analysis instead of intuition and ideological conviction. In short, the practice aspired to and encouraged rational leadership and policy making.[51] There might accordingly, FRA deputy director Johan Tunberger concluded, 'exist incentives to massage intelligence simply to reach the end user in those cases when the intelligence militated against the end user's prejudices and instincts.'[52] It might even

[48]Lars Ulfving, *Spegellabyrinten: Operativ-strategisk underrättelsetjänst – Något om teori, empiri och metod* (Stockholm: FHS, 2002), 60, 97.
[49]Erlander, *Dagböcker 1945–1949*, 160–161. The written report was issued only on 3 February. Grahn, *FRA och det kalla krigets början*, 24.
[50]Gregory F. Treverton, *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 134, 191.
[51]Herman, *Intelligence Power*, 152.
[52]Johan Tunberger, Strategisk underrättelsetjänst: Några synpunkter, Inträdesanförande i Kungliga krigsvetenskapsakadmin, 7 May 1998, 13. Translation from the Swedish original. Tunberger, formerly at FOA, was then an FRA director.

be necessary, noted Lars Ulfving, formerly of Swedish military intelligence, to inoculate the policy maker with the conclusion of the intelligence service indirectly through somebody in whom the policy maker had confidence, usually a colleague of equal social standing, instead of presenting it as the assessment of an anonymous intelligence analyst far below the policy maker on the hierarchical scale and pay-grade.[53] The need to reach out to the end user of the reporting in a decisive manner was noted in other countries, too. The British SIGINT chief Sir David Omand observed that 'sometimes it [the intelligence community] will have to shout louder to be heard through the background noise of other events.'[54]

The oral briefing, delivered from somebody whom the policy maker knew and trusted, was accordingly the solution to the small intelligence service's quest to encourage rational policy making and decisions grounded in evidence-based conclusions and not mere opinions and ideological conviction. Hence, a keyword in the analyst-policy maker relationship was trust. The relationship had to develop into a partnership of sorts, in which the policy maker had the final word but the intelligence analyst did not shrink from presenting the service's argument in a clear and distinct voice. This lesson from the Cold War appears to be just as valid in the present and future, with the aforementioned risk of intelligence analysis transforming in an ever more cautious direction due to current demands for transparency and accountability.

It thus follows that briefings should be undertaken with a show business approach. The briefer must not only brief, in an engaging manner, but also be prepared to *defend* the service's conclusions. While the show business approach implies a certain level of showmanship, the briefer functions more in the role of an educator. He or she must emphasize and defend the conclusions, since policy makers have a tendency to cherry-pick those pieces of information that suit their policy initiatives. It follows that it is, for this reason, seldom worthwhile to present policy makers with alternative conclusions, unless the situation truly is an exceptional one. While some would argue that the show business approach rules out objectivity, showmanship and objectivity compliment, not oppose, each other. Indeed, few would complain when a teacher explains the facts in a way that his or her students understand and will remember.

A consecutive series of reporting that gradually gave a cumulative effect was another method to make sure that the policy maker took notice of the service's conclusions, since a series of reports often had an unintentionally greater impact than a single report.[55] This, too might be an educational method to bring forward a message. But far from always. More often than one might think, it was the one, unique briefing or report that became of crucial importance for the decision-making process. This was, for instance, what happened with regard to Prime Minister Erlander and the Polish election of 1947, to which we now will return.

Following the Polish election of 1947, Prime Minister Erlander, as noted, received a briefing by Andersson from the FRA. Andersson presented the facts of the situation as the FRA had been able to ascertain through its cryptanalysis effort against Polish military

[53]Ulfving, *Spegellabyrinten*, 60.
[54]Sir David Omand, *Securing the State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 27. Omand joined the British SIGINT service, the GCHQ, in 1969 and worked for some time under Michael Herman. Omand later became the head of the GCHQ. Ibid., xvii, xx.
[55]Herman, *Intelligence Power*, 143.

communications. But he went further. When Andersson briefed Erlander on the situation, he strongly emphasized the hostility of the communist side. Erlander certainly noted Andersson's emphasis, but he also realized the significance of the intelligence. Erlander wrote in his diary: 'One surely noticed how critical, not to mention hostile, the briefer Andersson from FRA was toward the Soviet Union. After today's cold shower from Poland one can only agree.[56]

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[56]Erlander, *Dagböcker 1945–1949*, 160–161. Translation from the Swedish original.